To be asked to edit one edition was impressive enough, but to be asked to edit a second edition is . . .well . . . also impressive. And it is not really a second ‘edition’. While some authors from the first edition have kindly joined us in this second, and some topics are similar, most chapters and authors are entirely new and fresh. The organising principles of this edition are different from the first, in which we sought to stress the legal contexts and links between psychology and law. In this edition we have tried to highlight developments in, and roles for, psychology and law, but a number of principles remain common to both editions. We believe that there must be a ‘dialogue’ between the disciplines and professions, explicitly from a level starting point. Law may have been both an independent discipline and a profession for much longer than psychology, but it does not follow that the latter must adopt the former’s perspectives or assumptions, let alone perpetuate them. There is an important role for psychology in the provision of expert evidence to the courts in individual cases. But that is neither the beginning nor the end of psychology’s role! We must accept the reality of the law, and we must accept that that is what the courts will decide and enforce, but we are not obliged to accept that that is how it must be when psychological research or insights tell us otherwise. So, for example, several chapters in these Handbooks emphasise the potential of psychology to inform law reform. We are also concerned about an artificial and premature narrowing of ‘psychology and law’. For many the phrase seems to refer to psychologists interested in the law and practice as it relates to criminal justice and mental health matters. We consider that to be frighteningly narrow. We believe that psychology has a great deal to offer to all areas of law, civil as well as criminal, procedural as well as substantive. Professional issues, for example distinguishing clinical from educational and occupational, or disciplinary distinctions, for example abnormal from social psychology, should not restrict the development of an understanding of how the behavioural sciences can inform and improve the law and laws. It is not just that social and occupational psychologists and other behavioural scientists, for example, should be welcomed at psychology and law conferences and be represented in such books and journals, but that this developing interest and topic will be diminished by their absence. We believe that psychology and law is not just a theoretical and applied subject but has considerable opportunity for both reflecting and advocating change. And this edition particularly reflects this belief. There are several chapters, particularly in Parts 3 and 4, which relate the dramatic organisational developments in our subject area. For example, important and exciting developments, which challenge many preconceptions about how our courts should operate, are taking place in the growth of restorative justice interventions around the world and in problem-solving courts in the USA in particular. Whether psychology and law should, explicitly, recognise that it is inevitably concerned with the promotion of justice, albeit granting that that will involve value disputes, is discussed, by one of us, in the opening chapter. Part 1 of this Handbook considers psychology in, perhaps, its most traditional context—that is, providing information for the courts. Murphy and Clare update their chapter in the first edition, examining when and how psychology can, or could, help the courts to decide who is capable of making which legal decisions. Then Vrij examines what courts and judicial agencies might learn about how to assess and detect deception, and Bryant examines issues involved when assessing individuals for compensation purposes. We would ask readers to question whether the law and courts, in their particular countries, allow themselves to know about and be informed sufficiently on these topics. Part 2 examines examples of how psychology is being, and could further be, developed to assist a wide range of professionals and practitioners in undertaking tasks which could have legal implications, particularly if not well performed. Milne and Bull consider police interviewing techniques. If this task is poorly performed what hope can there be for the later stages in the criminal process? Heilbrun examines what we know about assessing and managing dangerous people. But the emphasis is on how we use and manage the information we gain and not just how we might present it to courts. Carson follows this with an appeal for greater interdisciplinary cooperation on the understanding and practice of risk-taking. While courts and lawyers need to know more about the topic, he suggests that psychologists could end up victimised if they do not consider the implications of their roles in the total process. There follow three chapters identifying the potential of psychology to better inform understanding and practice in criminal justice and policing. Canter and Young's articulate the case for not restricting the subfield to offender profiling but rather recognising that as an example of how psychology can help investigations. Williamson identifies the many problems that arise when that most basic of needs for any organisation, clear data, is not provided. He refers to data on crime which is regularly misused by other actors. Fritz on and Watts then consider the potential of psychology to information to prevent crime, not just to identify and respond to it. This prevention theme, which we suggest is not usually given the prominence it deserves, is also taken up by L¨osel who examines a wealth of sources to identify key factors both predictive and protective of childhood delinquent conduct. Part 2 then ends with chapters by Trowell, on the implications of disputes for children, and child psychiatrists Yates and Vizard, on the debate surrounding the competence of children to commit crimes. Part 3 focuses on trials. McAuliff, Nemeth, Bornstein and Penrod examine the potential for assisting those who have to make decisions about disputed facts. Greene and Wrightsman compare such decision-making by country and between judges and juries. Saks and Thompson place the focus on the disputed evidence. Faigman considers the contribution of expert evidence to court decisions, and the rationale that should underpin the process. Carson and Pakes identify some of the mechanisms that lawyers can use to encourage witnesses to say what they want the courts to hear. This Part ends with a discussion of restorative justice developments in the USA and the UK by Drogin, Howard and Williams, and a description of the proactive judges in the problem-solving courts which have been developing, particularly in the USA. There are those who decry the relative absence of lawyers in the psychology and law ‘movement’. We would suggest that such critics should consider such developments as those which are often led by judges and lawyers. They demonstrate a willingness, by many, to think and to act radically. The real problem may be those who restrict their image of the developing field to the traditional one of experts, accepting the law’s limited perspective, to inform them about a particular case. Much more is going on and, as this Part demonstrates, much more could take place. Part 4 identifies the role of psychology as a major contributor to debates about the law, and its potential for reform. The controversy surrounding ‘recreational’ drugs is one which deserves information and challenge. And Davies does that. Meanwhile Henderson, a lawyer, examines the perceptions with which lawyers approach child witnesses in sexual abuse trials. Again, if we do not consider our own and others’ perceptions of the issues we both work on, then we are unlikely to communicate efficiently. Gumpert provides a Swedish perspective on allegations of child sexual abuse and how expert testimony is utilised. Eye-witnessing remains, and is likely to remain, a cornerstone of evidence in many criminal trials. It is also a source of much valuable research. Yarmey reviews this. Is it not time that we acknowledged how much is already known, and the potential for developing both ‘consensus statements’ and agreement to promote them with different governments? Brown and Porteous, psychologist and lawyer, examine developments in England and Wales, in particular, on the causation and extent of workplace stress. And much Much more

2.99 USD InStock